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Middleton vs. Warden, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 74, 98 P.3d 694
(Oct. 14, 2004)1
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – APPELLATE
REPRESENTATION
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court removed Middleton’s appointed appellate counsel
due to substandard representation. On initial review, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered
Middleton's counsel to submit an amended brief, limited to 80 pages. Counsel's
"amended" brief was simply the original brief with the final few pages removed so as to
meet the 80-page requirement. Counsel had repeatedly violated court orders, and the
work product he ultimately submitted was unacceptable for representation of a client who
was facing a death sentence.
Disposition/Outcome
Middleton's counsel was removed, and the denial of Middleton's habeas corpus
petition was vacated. The case was remanded with instructions that the trial court appoint
new post-conviction counsel to represent Middleton.
Factual and Procedural History
David Middleton was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of two counts of firstdegree murder and was sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed Middleton’s conviction and death sentences on direct appeal.2
Middleton originally filed a post-conviction habeas corpus petition in the district
court in May 1999. In May 2000, the district court appointed Washoe County Public
Defenders to Robert Bruce Lindsay and Ian Silverberg to represent Middleton.3 Later, the
district court ordered for an amended petition to be filed on Middleton’s behalf. Although
one year and seven months had passed since their appointment, Lindsay and Silverberg
informed the district court in December 2001 that they did not have enough time to
work on the petition. In March 2002, after several missed deadlines, Lindsay and
Silverberg filed a 305-page supplemental petition.
At the outset of an evidentiary hearing in June 2002, the district court summarily
dismissed most of the claims raised in the petition. In November 2002, the district court
issued a preliminary order denying Middleton relief on the remaining claims. In January
2003, the district court issued a final order denying Middleton all relief. Lindsay then
took on the sole representation of Middleton on appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.
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Summarized by Ryan Hall.
See Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 968 P.2d 296 (1998); Sheriff v. Middleton, 112 Nev. 956, 921
P.2d 282 (1996).
3
See NEV. REV. STAT. 34.820(1) (requiring the appointment of counsel for a capital defendant's first postconviction habeas corpus petition).
2

After six orders from the Nevada Supreme Court directing Lindsay to file an
overdue opening brief, Lindsay finally submitted an 88-page opening brief on December
23, 2003. The court then issued an order directing Lindsay to file an amended brief of not
more than 80 pages.4 The order noted that Lindsay may have misapprehended the
procedural rules and case law governing the content, form, and citation requirements of
briefs for post-conviction capital cases. The order also noted that Lindsay had asserted
that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Haberstroh5 had constrained him to
limit the appendix of his brief. The court advised Lindsay that Haberstroh should not be
read to deter including relevant appendix materials that may be helpful to understanding
the nature of the case or the issues presented.
On February 10, 2004, Lindsay submitted an opening brief of exactly 80 pages.
The Nevada Supreme Court later discovered that the "amended" opening brief was
simply the original submitted brief with the final eight pages removed.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court stressed that capital cases are distinguishable from
other criminal cases not only by the severity of sentence given to the defendant but also
by the lengthy proceedings and complex issues that such a sentence entails.6 The court
acknowledged the unique burdens placed upon defense counsel who represent capital
defendants.7 However, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that capital defense counsel
contribute vitality to the court's deliberative process and assist the court in ensuring that
capital cases receive a "just and expeditious final disposition."8
The Nevada Supreme Court mentioned that the highest standards of competence
and diligence are expected of capital defense counsel in all stages of the criminal
proceedings.9 When such standards are not met, the court must exercise its inherent
authority to sua sponte remove counsel from representing a capital defendant.10
Lindsay had repeatedly violated court orders and procedural deadlines. Despite
the generous amount of time afforded to Lindsay in which to complete and file his
opening brief and appendix, the work product he ultimately submitted was wholly
substandard and unacceptable.
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See Hernandez v. State, 117 Nev. 463, 468, 24 P.3d 767, 770 (2001) (providing that an 80-page limit
provides a capital appellant with an "ample and fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits");
NRAP 28(g) (providing that the length of appellate briefs shall not exceed 30 pages without this court's
permission).
5
119 Nev. 173, 69 P.3d 676 (2003).
6
SCR 250(1) ("This court places the highest priority on diligence in the discharge of professional
responsibility in capital cases."); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393, 97 S. Ct.
1197 (1977) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that death is a different kind of punishment from any other).
7
See Young v. District Court, 107 Nev. 642, 644, 818 P.2d 844, 845 (1991) (recognizing "the necessary
latitude defense counsel must have in representing criminal defendants, especially in capital cases").
8
See SCR 250(1).
9
See id.; SCR 151 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."); SCR 153 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.").
10
See Young, 107 Nev. at 646-47, 818 P.2d at 846-47; SCR 39.

The rules governing the proper format for briefs and appendices filed before the
Nevada Supreme Court are set forth in NRAP 28 through NRAP 32.11 The Nevada
Supreme Court stressed that pervasive violations of the relevant NRAP provisions will
not be disregarded, especially when such violations impair the court's ability to
meaningfully dispose of the issues raised on appeal. Lindsay's opening brief and
appendix contained many flagrant violations of the relevant NRAP provisions.
The opening brief submitted by Lindsay was disorganized and incoherent.
Throughout the brief were multiple pages of citation to case law with little or no factual
analysis or support.12 Compounding such deficiencies were improper legal citations,
typographical errors, and arguments with no discernable beginning or end.
Despite the court's explicit directives, Lindsay maintained his incorrect reading of
Haberstroh and failed to include a relevant statement of facts in his opening brief.13 Also,
Lindsay failed to provide supporting citations to the appendix.14 To comply with the 80page limit, Lindsay made no effort to amend the opening brief and chose instead to tear
out the final eight pages, omitting any discussion of four other issues listed in the brief's
table of contents.
The appendix filed by Lindsay was also inadequate. Lindsay failed to include
numerous documents and portions of the district court proceedings that appear essential
to addressing the claims he raised.15 Other documents Lindsay included were incomplete,
unsigned, marked up with personal notes, or not stamped by the district court.
These multiple NRAP violations indicated a clear disregard by Lindsay for the
Nevada Supreme Court, the rules governing the practice of attorneys, and the obligations
incumbent upon him as counsel for a client facing a death sentence. If Lindsay was
physically or mentally unable to diligently submit a competent work product, then it was
his obligation to withdraw as Middleton's counsel.16 His failure to do so had impaired the
court's ability to achieve a meaningful disposition of Middleton's appeal.
SCR 250(2)(d) provides that counsel appointed to represent a capital defendant in
a post-conviction appeal must be "capable and competent to represent the appellant."
Lindsay's performance in Middleton’s appeal fell far short of the capable and competent
representation standard. Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court was compelled to sua
sponte remove Lindsay as Middleton's counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court further
prohibited Lindsay from practicing before the court in any future cases without the court's
express prior authorization.17 The Nevada Supreme Court also referred Lindsay to the
State Bar of Nevada for disciplinary proceedings regarding his performance.18
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See SCR 250(7)(c).
See NRAP 32(a) ("Except for quotations and footnotes, the lines [of a brief] shall be double-spaced.").
13
See NRAP 28(a)(3) (providing that a brief must contain "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review"); Collins v. Murphy, 113 Nev. 1380, 1385, 951 P.2d 598, 601 (1997).
14
See NRAP 28(e) ("Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a
reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.").
15
See NRAP 30(b)(3) (providing that an appellant's appendix must include "portions of the record essential
to determination of issues raised" on appeal); NRAP 30(b)(2).
16
See SCR 166(1)(b).
17
See SCR 99; NRAP 28A. Lindsay may continue as counsel for the appellants in two cases presently
pending before this court: White v. State, Docket No. 43223, and Fiel v. State, Docket No. 43709.
18
See SCR 104.
12

Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court removed Lindsay as counsel and vacated the district
court order denying Middleton's habeas corpus petition. The Nevada Supreme Court
instructed the district court to appoint new counsel to represent Middleton on remand.

